1. Memphis attorney Lauran Glassman-Stimac sued for malpractice because she missed time limits in plaintiff's medical malpractice case and covered it up.
This despite her ethical obligation to tell the client she that she missed the statute of limitations and the case was dismissed because of her lack of attention.
See paragraph 16 of the lawsuit for legal malpractice that was filed against her in this PDF.
Her father Richard Glassman, the senior partner in the firm, was the lead attorney on this case and he also bears responsibility for this legal malpractice.
Glassman at age 77 years old in 2023 is too old to be a trial attorney.
Glassman has lost every malpractice case he has tried - making him 0-17. No lawyer in the State of Tennessee has such an awful record.
2. Richard Glassman commits legal malpractice in accounting malpractice case and is called out by federal judge for making unsupported statements in writing to the Court.
Glassman, well known for making unsupported statements in court, commits five acts of legal malpractice in his motion to dismiss an accounting malpractice case while defending case brought against Crane, Thompson and Jones ("CTJ"). The Court rules Glassman's work on behalf of this accounting firm (CTJ) is inadequate and in violation of the local rules of the federal court.
Here are direct quotes from the Court's decision criticizing Glassman's work. This decision is in PDF.
“Local Rule 7.1(b) provides that "[b]riefs shall include a concise statement of the factual and legal grounds which justify the ruling sought from the Court." Since Defendant made no attempt to develop an argument with respect to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the Court concludes that it has waived any such argument(s) at this stage. See McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995 ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."). (p. 11)
“Defendant, however, does not point to any particular portion of the complaint that it insists is lacking in detail, and the Court declines to search through the complaint for potential defects. See City of Morristown v. BellSouth Telecomms., LLC, 206 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1337 (E.D. Tenn. 2016) ("Defendants' argument is two sentences long. Defendants do not identify any portion of the Complaint - paragraphs, phrases, or words - that is wanting in particularity. The Court is not at liberty to scour the Complaint for defects that come within the wide net that Defendants have cast."); see also McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995-96; Local R. 7.1(b). Accordingly, the Court concludes that CTJ has not met its burden to dismiss Count IV of the complaint."(pps 13-14)
“And, again, Defendant asserts that HomeTrust has not pled this claim with the necessary "degree of specificity," yet it omits any explanation as to why Plaintiff's allegations are not specific enough i.e., what information is lacking. For that reason, the Court declines to address CTJ's Rule 9(b) argument. (pps 18-19)
Second, CTJ does not identify any particular portion of the complaint that is lacking in particularity. As Defendant failed to develop this argument, the Court concludes that CTJ has not met its burden to dismiss Count V of the complaint." (pps 21-22.)
As to Defendant's alternative request for a more definite statement, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), the Court concludes that Defendant has waived this argument by failing to develop any argument in support thereof. McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995-96. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff's one-sentence request, inserted at the end of its response, for leave to amend its complaint is not well taken. If HomeTrust desires to amend its complaint, it must file a separate motion and brief in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and Local Rule 7.1." (p. 23)
3. Glassman, Wyatt, Tuttle and Cox partners Kyle Cannon and Lewis Lyons, who normally handle minor insurance defense cases such as car wrecks and work comp cases, bring plaintiffs' class action in New Jersey and get shredded by federal judge in blistering 59 page decision, after the US Department of Justice and Attorneys General of 19 states object to the settlement that proposed to give class members coupons worth next to nothing, while lawyers would take home $1.7 million for work that the judge soundly criticized as being inadequate and unhelpful.
Here are some direct quotes from the Court's ruling that is in this PDF.
“The parties also neglected to direct the Court's attention to at least two other important aspects of the proposed settlement." (p. 11). "The parties also neglected to direct the Court's attention to at least two other important aspects of the proposed settlement. First, as later became clear, the proposed settlement contained material differences between the class as proposed in the Complaint, and the proposed settlement class. The Complaint proposed a class encompassing customers who purchased only A and B wines. The proposed settlement class, however, added an entirely new group of proposed class members: customers who purchased neither A nor B wines, i.e., C wines. The significance of this change, and why it deeply troubles the Court, will be discussed infra. Second, the parties also did not adequately address the class certification requirements. In particular, at no time during the preliminary approval hearing, nor in the parties' papers in support of the motion for preliminary certification, did the parties address the interaction between the Court's Opinion on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Certify the Settlement Class." (pps. 11-12)
“Early in January, 2018, the Court started receiving objections from class members, and the potential, indeed, fundamental, problems with the proposed class and the proposed settlement began to surface. By the objection deadline, the Court had received ten objections, as well as filings by the United States Department of Justice, Consumer Protection Division, and the Arizona State Attorney General on behalf of 19 States' Attorneys General." (pps 12-13)
“In the Court's experience, the objectors in this case qualify as vociferous." (p. 12)
“In addition to these written submissions, the Court has held two hearings spanning almost six hours. The Court has undertaken all of this in an attempt to ascertain all of the information necessary to decide whether to certify the proposed class and approve the proposed settlement.
Unfortunately, despite this Court's best efforts to afford the parties ample opportunity to provide the Court with the information it requires, many fundamental and important questions remain unanswered." (p. 16)
“Plaintiffs unequivocally state in their brief, "from the start of the [pre-suit case] investigation until entry into this [Settlement] Agreement, Class Counsel obtained no discovery from [Defendant]." (p. 39)
“Under such circumstances the Court cannot determine the value of the settlement to the class and cannot hold that the proposed settlement is fair to the class." (p. 52)
“Notably, the parties have not submitted a single statement from a single class member-- not even from the named Plaintiffs-- stating the class member's interest in using the Credits." (p. 52)
“Yet class members do not know how much their pro rata distribution will be when the choice must be made. How is such a forced choice, based on insufficient information, fair to the class? This is another question the parties have not answered." (p. 57
In sum, too many questions remain, and without answers, the Court is unequipped to approve the parties' settlement.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Final
Settlement Approval will be denied. An appropriate Order shall issue on this date.
Dated: April 17, 2018
Renee Marie Bumb
RENEE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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